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John Najarian, transplant surgeon. He is a man whose intelligence, genius,
and skill in the operating room have allowed him to pioneer an entire eld
of medicine. Over the past three decades he has performed countless organ
transplants, rst at the University of San Francisco and most recently as chief
of surgery at the University of Minnesota. In doing so he has almost single-
handedly developed the practice of organ transplantation into what could be
considered a routine procedure. His collegues in academia revere him: \a gi-
ant of 20th century medicine," in the words of the University of Pennsylvania's
Arthur Caplan.1 His patients worship him: \I'd go to the ends of the Earth
for him," says Charles Fiske of Bridgewater, Massachusetts, the father of Jamie
Fisk, whose 11-month old kidney Najarian successfully replaced in 1982.2 There
is no question that this 69-year-old son of Armenian immigrants who passed up
a professional football career to practice medicine is a model of the American
success story.
Stanislaw R. Burzynski, cancer physician. His development and prescription of
a mysterious new cancer drug provided treatment thousands of patients since
the opening of his Texas clinic in 1977. The Polish-born physician, who grew up
under Nazi and then Soviet rule, has been a source of comfort and a doctor of
last resort for many long-time cancer victims \poisoned and burned" by years
1J. Madeleine Nash, Once a Hero: Surgeon John Najarian has saved hundreds of lives.
Now he's ghting to save his reputation," Time Magazine, May 11, 1995.
2Id.
1of unsuccessful chemotherapy and radiation.3 In recent years `Dr. B,' as his
patients fondly call him, has evolved into a national folk hero in the populist
struggle for access to alternative medical care has even prompted a series of
congressional hearings on the ethics and ecacy of such treatments.
Najarian and Burzynski seem the perfect examples of the amazing potential of
the American medical establishment. Their visionary work in their respective
elds should be celebrated as monumental contributions to society. Rather than
being lauded by the nation, though, both men have watched their careers and
reputations come hurtling to a disastrous end as they faced criminal charges of
fraud, embezzlement, and multiple violations of Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) laws which threatened to send them each to prison for the rest of their
lives. The FDA charges centered around alleged improprieties involving the pre-
scription of their revolutionary new drugs: Najarian's antilymphocyte globulin
(ALG), a \potent cocktail of antibodies" capable of preventing the rejection of
transplanted organs,4 and Burzynski's antineoplastons, the mysterious cancer
medication made from compounds found in human urine.5 In both cases the
FDA contended that the men conspired to prescribe and sell the drugs in the
absence of agency approval, with each reaping millions of dollars in the process.
Both men claim that the FDA is merely extending its claws at the urging of
the big-money pharmaceutical interests that they claim control the agency, and
that the FDA is \piling on" with additional criminal charges in order to buttress
3Jesse Katz, Cancer `Pioneer' on Trial After Bucking the System, Los Angeles Times,
Jan. 12, 1997, A16.
4Nash, supra, note 1.
5United States v. Burzynski, Indictment, No. H-95-290, p. 2.
2their cases.
In the Najarian case, the court seemed to agree with these contentions as the
surgeon was acquitted on all FDA-related charges last January while a jury
found him not-guilty on the other counts a month later. The successful trial
outcome was achieved at no small cost, however, as Najarian was abandoned
by the University of Minnesota, lost his job, and watched his ALG program get
closed down indenitely. The outcome of Burzynski's case will be determined
shortly, as the trial opened two weeks ago in U.S. District Court in Houston.
Whatever the outcome, Burzynski, like Najarian, will have diculty moving
beyond the specter of a federal criminal investigation and removing the perma-
nent scars on his reputation. All as penetence for the crime, as the two doctors
would claim, of simply doing their jobs.
In cases like these, is the Food and Drug Administration performing its statutory
mission to vigorously enforce the law in the public interest? Or, by attacking
the use of these \new drugs" and bringing criminal charges against the men
prescribing them, is the agency \playing God" by denying, through stringent
application of bureaucratic pressure, hopeful patients of the treatments they
believe they are entitled to? This paper will analyze the Najarian and Burzyn-
ski cases in depth, with an eye trained on this larger issue. What is the true
mission of the FDA, and is the agency charting the wrong course to that goal
by its use of criminal prosecutions in the new drug arena?
FDA Statutory Authority to Bring Criminal Actions
3The FDA is an agency under the direction of the United States Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS). The agency has the statutory mandate
to regulate and monitor food and drug aspects of interstate and foreign com-
merce.6 The Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) allows the FDA
to criminalize nearly any one of the \Prohibited Acts" proscribed in 21 U.S.C.
x331, including, most relevant to new drug process prosecutions, \...(d) the
introduction into interstate commerce of any article in violation of section 344
or 355 of this title. (e) [T]he failure to establish or maintain any record or make
any report, required under [relevant provisions of the FDCA]."7 In other words,
the statute gives the agency tremendous latitude in imposing criminal penalties
if it so desires. Such a charge becomes a felony if the violation constitutes a
second conviction or is found to be committed \with the intent to defraud or
mislead."8 Another provision, 18 U.S.C. x3571, establishes limits of $250,000
for felony charges in such cases and permits up to three years of imprisonment
for each count.9 The nal decision on whether to impose criminal charges on
an alleged violation of the FDCA rests with the Commissioner of the FDA, the
Secretary of HHS, and the Department of Justice. In the end, all decisions are
purely within the discretion of the agency.10
The FDCA requires that drug companies or physicians apply for an exemption




918 U.S.C. x3571 serves as an overriding provision for the FDCA nes, yet preserves the
incarceration provisions from 21 U.S.C. x333.
10Jonathan S. Kahan, Criminal Liability Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act|the Large Corporation Perspective, Food Drug Cosmetic L.J. 314, 316 (1981).
4vestigational new drugs (IND). The IND process contains carefully worded re-
quirements involving the maintenance of data regarding the safety and ecacy
of the experimental drug.11 The Najarian and Burzynski cases are examples of
prosecutions involving alleged violations of the IND process requirements.
United States v. John S. Najarian
A Brief History of Minnesota-ALG
In the late 1960's, John Najarian rst developed ALG at the University of
Minnesota. The drug was created from the serum of horses which had been in-
jected with human lymphocytes.12 In 1970, he and his collegue, Richard Condie
submitted an IND application and obtained approval to conduct studies on the
drug's safety and ecacy as an anti-rejection medication for organ transplants.
They did not, however, receive permission from the FDA to produce the drug
at a prot. This became the major issue which would come back to haunt the
program.13 Over the course of more than a decade, Najarian was barraged by
more and more of his collegues in the transplant community who heard about
the drug's success, and ALG gradually became the norm at nearly every trans-
plant center in the world.14 \The one-year survival rate for kidney grafts had
been about 40 percent," said Dr. David Sutherland, one of Najarian's fellow
surgeons at the University of Minnesota. \With ALG, it rose to about 80%."15
11See 21 C.F.R. xx312.64, 312.68.
12John W. Lundquist, United States v. Najarian: A Postmortem on Regulatory Misdirec-
tion, 131 Archives of Surgery 911, Sep. 1996.
13Gordon Slovut, With Trial Over, What Happens to ALG?, Minneapolis Star-Tribune,
Feb. 26, 1996.
14Lundquist, supra, note 12, at 911.
15Slovut, supra, note 13.
5Due to the increase in demand for the drug, Najarian attempted to nd a pri-
vate drug company to take over production. He was rebued, however, because
the companies saw the transplant patient market as too narrow. After a brief
attempt at production with a small Minnesota-based rm, ALG returned to the
University of Minnesota, which decided to build a new $15 million facility for
the drug program.16 By the late 1980's the University was producing more than
40,000 g of the drug for distribution to more than 100 treatment centers around
the globe.17 A 1989 letter from the FDA to the University formally allowed
the ALG program to continue to do what it claims it had been doing for years:
sell the drug at a price sucient to cover its costs, but asserting that no prot
on the sale would be authorized or permitted.18 Between 1972 and 1990, the
University of Minnesota recovered approximately $79 million in cost recovery
sales.19
Criminal Charges Bring Minnesota-ALG to a Crashing Halt
ALG's amazing ride to the top of the medical world received a startling blow
in April 1995 when criminal charges were led in United States District Court
in St. Paul, Minnesota. Najarian was charged with a conspiracy to violate the
FDCA, including allegations that he failed to report adverse reactions to ALG,
that he failed to receive informed consent from patients, and that the $79 mil-
lion recovered by the University violated the cost recovery authorization given
16Id.
17Lundquist, supra, note 12, at 911.
18United States v. Najarian, Superseding Indictment, No. 3-95-45.
19Lundquist, supra, note 12 at 911.
6by the FDA. In addition to the FDA-related counts, Najarian was also accused
of tax fraud, mail fraud, embezzlement, and stealing.20
The case went to trial on January 16, 1996. The attorneys for Najarian hoped
to paint a picture of FDA acquiescence over a period of more than 20 years,
suggesting to those involved with the ALG program that the situation was
proceeding in a legitimate fashion. They argued that lapses in oversight, incon-
sistency among the numerous FDA investigators who oversaw the program21
and the widespread use of ALG in general rendered the government's case in-
valid. The United States Attorney for the District of Minnesota attempted to
argue that Najarian acted in the interest of furthering his own \personal power
and prestige," and blatantly violated FDA regulations for more than twenty
years.22
After the government rested its case, Judge Richard H. Kyle entered an ac-
quittal judgment on all of the FDA charges. A month later the jury acquitted
Najarian on the remaining counts. The outcome of the trial left Najarian a free
man, but left many questions open as to Najarian's reputation, the future of
ALG, and the handling of the case by the FDA itself. The scathing comments
by Judge Kyle at the close of the trial identied many of these issues:
This has been a long, rough case. I am sure the defendant is relieved with
it, but I don't read the verdict as saying that everything that went on with the
ALG program was done properly...but the jury has rendered its verdict and
that verdict is, as indicated, not guilty...I have some question as to why we
are here at all, quite frankly. Not because there weren't things that were wrong
with the program, but it was a program that was looked at by the FDA for 15 to
20United States v. Najarian, Superseding Indictment, No. 3-95-45.
21More than 20 people at the FDA had some measure of responsibility for the regulation of
ALG during the twenty years of the program. Lundquist, supra, note 12, at 914.
22Lundquist, supra, note 12, at 911.
720 years with what I guess I could describe as benign neglect...converting all of
this to a criminal proceeding of the magnitude that we saw here, it seems to me
has gone or did go beyond the bounds of common sense. We had a program here
in Minnesota which, for all its problems and shortcomings was a good program,
literally saved thousands of lives. It should have been run better and it wasn't,
but I have serious doubts as to whether that type of program should have been
subjected to a criminal proceeding of this kind.23
So why did the FDA bring a criminal suit in this case? Skeptics close to
Minnesota politics believe that United States Attorney David Lillehaug was
looking for political legitimacy in a future governor's race by toppling the well-
known surgeon.24 Najarian himself implied that big business interests in the
pharmaceutical industry prompted the FDA to bring the charges. He believed
that the producers of the major drugs competing with ALG felt threatened by
the success rate and low cost of his drug, prompting them to exert pressure on
the agency.25
Implications of the Najarian Case
While it is dicult to assess any political or institutional reasons for the
case, it is important to reect on the implications for future FDA criminal
actions and for the interests of the public health in general. While Najarian was
permanently exonerated by the court, ALG itself remains in a state of purgatory.
The FDA has not lifted its ban on the continued study or prescription of the
product, leaving only the higher priced alternatives as legitimate anti-rejection
23United States v. Najarian, Transcript of February 21, 1996.
24Conversation with Montevideo, MN attorney, Stephen L. Stennes, January 21, 1997.
25The major competitors with ALG are ATGAM, a similar, horse-derived product manufac-
tured by Upjohn Co., and OKT-3, a product made from mouse cells by Ortho Pharmaceuticals
Co.. Sloyut, supra, note 13.
8drugs.26 And while Najarian has expressed his wish to bring ALG back into the
medicinal mainstream, his scarred reputation will make this a dicult task. In
other words, the real losers in this case are not the politically minded government
attorneys, but the liver, kidney, and other organ transplant patients who will
be denied access to this long used, and seemingly standard, drug.
Perhaps the most interesting paradox in the case involves the interplay between
the IND process and the eventual criminal charges against Najarian. He was
rst criticized and nally indicted in part because of his premature use and
sale of a yet-to-be approved drug. The spirit of the IND process itself is to
determine the safety and ecacy of a new drug. Over the twenty-plus years
that the FDA acquiesced to the use of ALG at the University of Minnesota
and other treatment centers, it essentially pushed ALG out of the experimental
stage and made it standard therapy. This paradox was identied by Najarian's
attorney John Lundquist as follows:
It is paradoxical and disconcerting that the FDA not only acquiesced in,
but also encouraged the widespread distribution of ALG across the country,
thus enhancing its status as standard therapy, only to later le criminal charges
against its principal investigator because the investigational drug was in fact
used as standard therapy. Although not criminally prosecuted, other leading
institutions were reprimanded by the FDA for failing to obtain written consent
for the use of ALG, even though it was regarded as standard therapy.27
This argument was pointed out by the Najarian defense attorneys and ap-
pears to have been a substantial factor in Judge Kyle's ruling: \The FDA as I
indicate, was certainly aware of what was going on, and yet they came in here
as a witness to testify that somehow they were hoodwinked by this defendant
26Slovut, supra, note 13.
27Lundquist, supra, note 12, at 913.
9and his colleagues and other people at the University."28 It begs an important
question about the implications of inconsistency within the agency over a period
of years. With a game of musical chairs involving inspectors during a long-term
IND process, how can doctors and institutions involved in research expect to
gauge the legality of their programs?
Perhaps more importantly, will surgeons begin to view this specter of crim-
inal prosecutions in the wake of the Najarian case as a deterrent in their de-
velopment of new drugs? While the FDA failed in sending Najarian to prison,
they did succeed in shutting down his operation and ruining his reputation. It
would be tragic if future medical visionaries are deterred from taking the same
chances Najarian did in his quest for a breakthrough treatment. The threat
of further ling of criminal cases by the FDA against new drug investigators is
likely to create precisely this eect within the research/medical community.29
Another concern in the aftermath of the Najarian case is the lack of support
from within the surgeon's own institution. Soon after the charges were brought
against Najarian, the University of Minnesota turned down a number of over-
tures from the doctor's attorneys requesting a joint defense agreement.30 Such
an agreement would have left internal investigations and communications be-
tween Najarian and the University's general counsel immune from discovery. In
28United States v. Najarian, Transcript of Feb. 21, 1996, supra, note 23.
29In his article on the Najarian case, Lundquist further explored this theory with actual
quotes from a number of research physicians: \One surgery department chairperson, referring
to the `serious anxiety amongst academic physicians,' predicted a `reluctance of many good
academic people taking on clinical trials knowing that there is this kind of capricious risk of
litigation by the government."' Lundquist, supra, note 12, at 914.
30United States v. Najarian, 915 F.Supp. 1460, 1468 (Minn. 1996).
10an eort to distance itself from the case, the University declined such oers and
took a position adverse to its famous faculty member. This left Najarian to ght
these charges on his own, abandoned by the very institution which supported
him throughout the history of the ALG program. In an ironic turn of events,
the University now faces a lawsuit of its own surrounding ALG and is being
forced to adopt many of the same defenses asserted by Najarian in the original
case.31
United States v. Stanislaw R. Burzynski
A Brief History of `Dr. B' and His Mysterious Cancer Drug
Is the man a quack and a charlatan or a visionary and a pioneer? As
the standard-bearer for an American's right to alternative medical treatments
in the absence of FDA approval, Dr. Stanislaw R. Burzynski has presented his
antineoplastons as important evidence. The debate over this treatment and the
issues that go along with the topic have launched a debate straight out of his
Texas clinic all the way to Capital Hill. Its most probing questions involve the
appropriate role of the FDA in cases in which patients have reached what they
believe to be the end of all their available ropes.
Dr. Burzynski rst developed antineoplastons in the late seventies.
A nontoxic blend of peptides and other amino acids, the drug was originally
31On December 19, 1996 the U.S. Department of Justice led a lawsuit worth more than
$100 million against the University over alleged misuse of federal research grants and the
illegal sales of ALG. The suit was joined with a whistleblower action led by a University of
Minnesota biology professor who stands to reap a multimillion-dollar windfall in the action.
Despite last minute appeals by Senators Rod Grams and Paul Wellstone, Rep. Jim Ramstad,
and Governor Arne Carlson, the DOJ refused a settlement oer and led suit as threatened.
Discovery is set to commence this spring.
11extracted from human urine but is now manufactured synthetically. As Dr.
Burzynski further explains, the antineoplastons \function as biochemical micro-
switches, turning o the genes that cause cancerous cells to grow and turning
on the ones that supress them."32 He marketed the drug as an alternative to
chemotherapy and radiation, the `standard' cancer treatments which ravage the
bodies of cancer patients and often provide little more than temporary relief.
The Burzynski clinic treated thousands of patients with antineoplas-
tons from 1977 to the present, and he developed a reputation among his patients
as a revolutionary lifesaver. The biggest problem, however, with Burzynski's
\miracle cure," was that it had not received the requisite approval from the
FDA.
The Criminal Case Against Burzynski
In May of 1983, U.S. District Judge Gabrielle McDonald issued an order that
permanently enjoined Burzynski and his clinic from producing and introducing
into commerce the antineoplastons. The injunction was to be in place until
Burzynski, 1) received an approved IND distinction from the FDA under 21
U.S.C. x355; or 2) received written statement from the FDA that the product
did not qualify as a \new drug." Burzynski met neither of these requirements
and continued to prescribe and administer the drug to his patients for treatment
of many dierent diseases, including AIDS, Parkinson's, and numerous forms of
cancer.33
32Katz, supra, note 3, at A16.
33United States v. Burzynski, Indictment, No. H-95-290, p. 8.
12After a series of private lawsuits against Burzynski, the Department of Justice
brought a criminal indictment against him for contempt of a federal order, 34
counts of mail fraud,34 and 40 counts of violating the federal food and drug
law. The FDCA counts allege that Burzynski and his clinic introduced into
interstate commerce large quantities of an unapproved drug without approval
of an application led under 21 U.S.C. x355.35 Burzynski faces up to three years
in prison and a $250,000 ne on each FDCA count and up to ve years in prison
and a $250,000 ne on each mail fraud count. The sentence for contempt lies
within the discretion of the trial judge.36
While the issues in the Najarian case have been litigated already, the most
legally important chapters of the Burzynski story are yet to be written. The trial
started earlier this month in United States District Court in Houston. Despite
an early setback in which the court ruled that the issue of the eectiveness of
antineoplastons was not an issue for the jury,37 Burzynski's attorneys remain
optimistic that he will emerge a free man. While they have indicated they
will not dispute that Burzynski sold and distributed the drug, they will argue
34The mail fraud claims allege that Burzynski attempted to defraud insurance companies by
using improper Current Procedural Terminology Codes (CPT Codes), misstating the medica-
tions prescribed to patients in order to get the costs reimbursed. United States v. Burzynski,
Indictment, supra, note 33, at 16.
35United States v. Burzynski, Indictment, supra, note 33, at 13.
36Bruce Nichols, Jury Told Doctor Delivered Drug Illegally, Dallas Morning News, Jan.
8, 1997, p. 19A.
37Burzynski's attorneys argued vehemently that it is unfair to keep the issues of the drug's
ecacy from the jury, and that the doctor could not receive a fair trial without this important
evidence. After considering the briefs from both sides, however, Judge Sim Lake reasoned that,
\This is not a wrongful death suit. Whether the drug worked or did not is not relevant." He
ruled that certain testimony from former patients as to the eectiveness of the drug would be
allowed only if Burzynski attempts to adopt a \necessity defense." Such a defense inplies that
a life-threatening situation arose which prompted someone to break the law. It is unlikely,
however, that the defense attorneys will attempt to make such a claim. Deborah Tedford,
Doctor Loses Round in Court, Houston Chronicle, January 3, 1997, p. 29.
13that his intent was never wrongful. \The medical oath requires that doctors
rst do no harm," said John Ackerman, Burzynski's attorney, \and (Dr. B.)
believes that to withhold antineoplastons is to do harm."38 Attorneys for the
government will hold rm to their contention that Burzynski never asked for
nor received the appropriate FDA approval for the drug.
The Bigger Issues Involved
While the outcome of the trial will not be clear until later this winter, the
issues raised by the compelling saga of the Texas cancer doctor are ripe for
debate. By shutting down and criminally punishing Burzynski is the FDA
performing its mission to protect the public health? Or, is the agency essentially
denying a medical treatment of last resort merely because the provider of that
treatment failed to comply with the strict bureaucratic rules of the approval
process?
\This truly is a matter of life or death,' said Steve Siegel, the husband of one
of Burzynski's patients. \My wife will die without this treatment."39 Other
patients echoed such statements: \What right do they have to tell me that we
can't come down here and be cured?" questioned Ric Schi, the father of six-
year-old patient Crystin Schi, who died in 1995 as a result of what he believes
were massive doses of ineective chemotherapy and radiation. \If those are
your other choices, which one do you choose?" he asked. \Who is the FDA
protecting us from?"40
38Nichols, supra, note 36, at 19A.
39Tedford, supra, note 37, at 29.
40Katz, supra, note 3, at A16.
14Ocials at the FDA argue that they have a strong interest in protecting the
public from \cancer quacks" who prey on desperate patients during their nal
hours. The agency has a long history of engaging in litigation with producers of
unapproved cancer treatments, must notably the drugs Laetrile and Krebiozen
in the sixties and seventies.41 Ocials at the agency truly believe strongly
in their responsibility to protect the consumer from false claims by \snake oil
salesmen."
From Populist Rhetoric to Political Debate: The Case Goes to
Washington
When it comes to remedies for cancer and AIDS, this clash of agency concern
and human choice becomes most thorny. This debate was propelled onto Capital
Hill last term with proposed legislation called the \Access to Medical Treatment
Act." The proposed bill species that an individual can be treated with any
medical treatment the individual desires, if: 1) the practitioner agrees to treat
that individual; and 2) the administration of such treatment does not violate
state licensing laws. It gives healthcare providers the option as to whether to
pay for nonapproved treatments.42 In response to consumer protection concerns
raised by opponents of the bill, proponents, such as Widener University Law Pro-
fessor Michael Cohen, argue that, \[T]he bill permits only treatments provided
by legally authorized providers and that do not unreasonably and signicantly
41See, e.g., Tutoki v. Celebreeze, 375 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1967); Rutherford v. American
Medical Ass'n, 379 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Hotsey Cancer Clinic, 198
F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1952).
42Access to Medical Treatment Act, S#1035.
15alter patient health. It incorporates informed consent requirements...and also
prohibits false or misleading labeling and forbids commercial advertising."43
The hearings held in the Senate involving the bill involved many of the major
players in the Burzynski case. Among those testifying were Shawn and Desiree
McConnell, of Fountain Hills, AZ, the parents of 7-year-old Zachary McConnell,
a patient who was given permission by the FDA to intially use antineoplastons,
only to nd the drug \yanked away" months later.44 In a prepared statement,
Mr. McConnell made a passionate and compelling case for the bill:
I realize that my son's treatment is \controversial" because of things that
have nothing to do with the medicine's abilities, but with lawyers and rules
which govern the WAY a drug is approved. That is irrelevant, because to seek
curative measures on their own should be encouraged. But current FDA law
looks upon us all as desperate minions too stupid or confused to think for
ourselves...The essence of the case for this bill lies in safety vs. ecacy. Safety
is an issue of public health, and a ne assignment for FDA scrutiny. Ecacy,
however, is consumer awareness. We are not judging CD players or fat-free
cookies here. Profound and private, life and death decisions are on sacred
ground. The FDA is out of place here...Lab scientists do not treat people in
need (emphasis in original).45
In perhaps an even more impassioned plea, young Zachary McConnell brought
with him to the hearing a letter he wrote to President Clinton, which said: \You
should re the man who won't let me have my medicine...I don't want to have
cancer anymore."46
On the other side of the argument, the bill was opposed by the FDA and
43Sue A. Blevins, Legalize Alternative Medicine, Christian Science Monitor, March 28,
1996.
44Zachary originally qualied for a \compassionate exemption" due to the seriousness of his
brain tumor, but the FDA rescinded the exemption shortly thereafter.
45Access to Medical Treatment Act, Hearings on S#1035 before the Senate Labor and Hu-
man Resources Committee, July 30, 1996 (testimony of Shawn McConnell).
46Je Barker, FDA `Playing God,' Parents Say Cancer Drug Sought for Ill Son, The
Arizona Republic, July 31, 1996, p. A1.
16many consumer groups for fear that it would open the door for aggressive doctors
to sell o-the-wall medications to desperate patients, simply in order to make
a buck. They also argued that the necessary levels of safety of drugs would be
less certain under such a regime, lacking in adequate safety testing.
Despite the support of powerful lawmakers on both sides of the aisle, the bill
has yet to reach the oor of either house.47 It is certain to come up again during
this session of congress and will likely receive even more serious consideration.
The court's ndings and the popular reaction to the Burzynski case are likely
to play a substantial role in the manner in which the political process muddles
through this debate.
The Big Picture: Lessons From Najarian and Burzynski Regarding FDA Policy
Dr. Najarian is attempting to rebuild his reputation in the aftermath
of the acquittal and Dr. Burzynski is currently ghting for his life in U.S. Dis-
trict Court. Even though the dust is far from settling in these cases, there are
clearly some important lessons to be learned from this brief case study:
1) The threat and use of criminal charges against research physi-
cians has created an \us versus them" attitude which could prove to be the real
danger to the public health.
It is clear that the Najarian case could have a substantial chilling eect on
academic surgeons interested in participating in the eld of new drug develop-
47Supporters of the bill included Sen. Tom Daschle (D-SD), Sen. Bob Dole (R-KS), Rep.
Peter DeFazio (D-OR), and Rep. Joe Barton (R-TX). Blevins, supra, note 43.
17ment. The fear that even 20 years of FDA acquiesence to a program might not
be enough to render a new drug development safe from criminal prosecution is
a likely deterrent from the perceived risks of entering the eld.48 Academic sur-
geons also argue that the increased risk of criminal liability further tips a scale
already weighted toward large pharmaceutical companies by the $400 million
cost of taking a new drug from discovery to the market.49
Anytime innovation is stunted in the new drug eld, the real loser is the
public health. The wildly creative antineoplastons and ALG's of today might
be the Salk vaccines and penicillins of tomorrow. There is no question that
fraud and mismanagement can occur over the course of a new drug develop-
ment. As Judge Kyle indicated, there is no doubt that there were problems
with Minnesota's ALG program. The FDA needs to realize, however, that more
interactive and consistent oversight, combined with the threat of civil sanctions,
is a better manner in which to deal with new drug development without stunt-
ing innovation.
2) There are clear problems with the bureaucratic structure of FDA
oversight which must be ameliorated in order to improve the new drug process.
Perhaps the most disconcerting feature of both cases centers around the
48A fear has also been expressed that the FDA has a tendency to buttress FDCA charges
with other criminal allegations in order to strengthen the legitimacy of a case. Judge Kyle
even commented in this issue at the close of the Najarian trial: \[S]omehow this combined
in an indictment which probably should have focused only upon the ALG and FDA program,
but was added on to with charges of tax fraud, mail fraud, embezzlement and stealing. I think
in football you kind of call the penalty for piling on. And that's what I thought this was."
United States v. Najarian, Transcript of Feb. 21, 1996, supra, note 28.
49Blevins, supra, note 43.
18inconsistency of FDA oversight and the mixed messages sent to Najarian and
Burzynski over the years. As indicated above, Najarian dealt with more than
20 dierent FDA inspectors during his tenure and was clearly confused by the
mixed messages sent regarding the ecacy and legality of the program. He was
told all of the following: rst, \Sell ALG;" then, \Don't sell ALG;" followed by,
\Sell it only up to cost;" then nally, \Quit making the drug altogether (even
though it had become standard fare in the entire transplant community)."
Burzynski's neoplastons received their own measure of inconsist treatment
from FDA. Six years into production he was enjoined from selling the drug at
all, only to be given permission to run clinical studies to prove its ecacy a
few years later. Finally, the plug was suddenly pulled on the drug altogether,50
leaving one patient to remark that, \I am in a war against cancer and the
government keeps trying to take away the only weapon I have."51
The FDA needs to streamline the oversight process as currently conducted
by its eld agents. It is vital that a single inspector (or as few as possible)
develop a sense of familiarity with a program and speak with one voice as the
FDA's mouthpiece for each particular drug development. As Inspector Wayne
Schafer testied in the Najarian trial, \[T]he bureaucracy is so prone to turnover
that the right hand does not always know what the left hand is doing."52 Only
50Only approximately 300 of what were formerly thousands of patients are allowed to be
treated currently under very close FDA scrutiny.
51Rebel Cancer Doctor Goes on Trial for Fraud, Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 6, 1997, p. 19.
52David Peterson, In Najarian Trial, Inspector Cites FDA Inaction, Minneapolis Star-
Tribune, Jan. 31, 1996.
19with consistency will the bureaucratic bumbling evident in the Najarian and
Burzynski cases be avoided.
3) There are some basic philosophical issues regarding the FDA's
unclear mission with regard to issues of access to alternative medical treatments.
The FDA enforces its IND and NDA (New Drug Application) programs in
order to protect the public from unsafe and ineective drugs. This is indeed
an important and admirable mission - one that few people will argue should
be changed. But what of the claims of a real public health interest when peo-
ple are faced with a terminal illness? As is clear from a study of the Senate
testimony, many believe that the real health concern is free access to whatever
treatment a terminally ill individual believes might save his or her life. There
is a fundamental clash here which can best be reconciled through legislative
means. The bipartisan bill proposed last term is a step in the right direction,
but our elected representatives must make a clear statement as to the FDA's
mandate in the realm of alternative medicine. Only after a vote on the Access
to Medical Treatment Act can this issue be truly resolved.
4) With the limited resources of the agency and the push for further
streamlining of the regulatory process, those physicians who enter the new drug
area must carry an even higher burden than normal when it comes to the ethical
and industrious production of new drugs.
The rst three \lessons" place the burden on the government to deal with
these issues. It would be unfair, however, to place all of the burden on the public
servants. In this era of \downsizing," \reinventing government," \devolution of
20power to the states," and \lower taxes," it is inevitable that the public sector
will lose some of its bark and bite. It is incumbent, therefore, that private
individuals and corporations shoulder even more personal responsibility than
ever before: In new drug development this means that investigators must keep
increasingly clear and more accurate records; those taking the hippocratic oath
must realize that they bear a responsibility to look beyond dollars and maintain
their common sense; the free press must continue to serve its function as an
oversight mechanism and alert the public to abuses in the system; and the large
research universities which play host to many of these studies must not lose
sight of the activities going on in their laboratories and hospital rooms.
Conclusion
The Najarian and Burzynski cases certainly have their dierences. Other
doctors came to Najarian for access to his controversial drug, while Burzynski
aggressively approached desperate patients with his. Najarian was viewed as a
giant of the industry and a major player in the mainstream medical establish-
ment prior to his FDA charges, while Burzynski has always been considered a
bit of a radical and a populist hero. Najarian attempted to use the IND process
for his own personal gain, while Burzynski maintained a fundamental disbelief
in the FDA approval system altogether. These dierences, among others, make
it clear that an acquittal in the Burzynski case is not a foregone conclusion.
For all their dierences, though, the sagas of these two doctors illuminate
21some important issues with regard to the status quo of Food and Drug Admin-
istration policy. In order to truly act in the interest of public health, the agency
needs to improve the way in which it deals with the creative and brilliant minds
who are developing the new drugs of tomorrow. The continued threat of criminal
prosecutions as used against research physicians and the stringent application
of bureaucratic pressure to deny desperate patients of hopeful treatments are
not the most eective ways to chart a course toward the FDA's public health
and safety mission.
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